One Pissed Off Veteran Vs. Dozens of Cops

Original Article

“There is no honor in hurting unarmed people! How do you sleep at night”
The Free Thought Project
Matt Agorist. May 31, 2014

Sgt. Shamar Thomas served in the US Marine Corps in Iraq. Upon his return to his hometown of New York City, he witnessed the police state that had been growing up around him.

The occupy movement helped to gain worldwide exposure of what the police have evolved to in the US.

As a veteran of the USMC myself, I know the effectiveness of veterans speaking out against, not only the police state, but the warfare state in general.

Perhaps that is why veterans are so often the target of the state’s violence. The credibility of someone speaking out against the very system they were once a part of, can move mountains; which happens to pose a large threat to the powers that be.

If you have been silent in the face of this rising police state, we encourage you to speak out against it, not only veterans , but all free thinking individuals. Use your voice now before you no longer have one.

Hopefully, now that nearly 3 years have passed, Thomas has opened his eyes to the global industrial war machine as well.

More Sgt. Shamar Thomas videos:


Supreme Court Rules Cops can Preemptively Shoot and Kill Motorists in High Speed Chases

Supreme Court Rules Cops can Preemptively Shoot and Kill Motorists in High Speed Chases

by Cassius Methyl
May 28, 2014


Cassius Methyl | The Anti Media

Arkansas police shot and killed a man named Donald Rickard as he attempted to cross a bridge into Memphis. He was shot 15 times and slaughtered by police for attempting get away from the Justice System. Image credit: Flickr/ takomabibelot

On Tuesday, the Supreme Court ruled that this was fine; police can now kill people who instigate ‘high speed chases’ .

The decision was unanimous, which clearly illustrates how much the Supreme Court values human life.

Supreme Court Justice Samuel A Alito says “We analyze this question from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” In other words, they are saying they can’t be held responsible for murder and they refuse to see it from any perspective other than the ‘reasonable officers on the scene’, who are known nationwide for killing the innocent .

Living in a time where police and the corrupt government are continuously granted excessive powers by their own fake mechanisms of ‘checks and balances’, this should not come as a surprise.

Using the danger posed to the public as an excuse to grant officers the power to murder, a person could be legally shot and killed in virtually any situation where they attempt to get away from being locked in a cage using a motor vehicle.

Surely we will see more people get shot for absurd reasons as this law settles into the fabric of the police states of America, and that will keep fueling the ideological opposition to such careless, immoral use of deadly force.

The Supreme Court denied this was unconstitutional with zero logic, with Justice Alito saying “It is beyond serious dispute that Rickard’s flight posed a grave public safety risk, and here the police acted reasonably in using deadly force to end that risk,” and that it would have been “a different case,” if the first shots fired “had clearly incapacitated Rickard” or “if Rickard had clearly given himself up.”.

So it’s okay to paralyze him, kill him, pretty much do anything to make sure this man faces the cold death grip of the police state? Never mind what he did in the first place, if he runs from the almighty power, he is to be slain in front of everyone.

Makes a lot of twisted sense.

Please share this with as many people as possible, so they can be aware of how easily they could become victims of the legal murderers of the police state.

This article may be freely republished under a Creative Commons license, with attribution to the author Cassius Methyl and Follow us on Twitter

Indiana Woman Raped By Husband & Justice System

Indiana woman angry ex-husband who raped her is sentenced to home detention


David Wise, 52, was sentenced to eight years of home detention for raping his ex-wife. He is seen here in a police photo.
INDIANAPOLIS – An Indianapolis woman say she doesn’t think she received justice from a judge who sentenced her ex-husband to no more time behind bars for raping her while she was asleep and possibly drugged.

Mandy Boardman told reporters Monday she felt “sucker punched in the gut” by a Marion County judge’s decision on Friday to sentence 52-year-old David Wise to eight years of home detention. A jury convicted Wise last month of one count of rape and five counts of criminal deviate conduct — all felonies punishable by six to 20 years in prison.

The Associated Press generally does not identify sexual assault victims but is using Boardman’s name because she decided to speak out publicly about the case.

Boardman testified that in 2008 she found three sex videos of her on Wise’s cellphone but didn’t remember the sex or consenting to the videos. She said she once woke up with a pill dissolving in her mouth.

“I want to be that person who’ll be strong for other women”
– Mandy Boardman
Boardman, who was married to Wise for 12 years until their 2009 divorce, said she made a DVD copy of the videos and went to police with them in 2011.

“During the reading of the sentence, the judge looked at me before he gave the final decision,” Boardman said. “I was told that I needed to forgive my attacker and move on. I received zero justice on Friday.”

Wise’s defense attorney, Elizabeth Milliken, told The Indianapolis Star that Wise intends to appeal his conviction but declined additional comment.

Judge Kurt Eisgruber declined to comment on the sentencing decision because of the planned appeal.

Wise has no previous felony convictions, according to the Marion County prosecutor’s office. He has been convicted of battery, public indecency and driving while intoxicated, all of which are misdemeanors.

Wise no longer has visitation rights for the couple’s son and daughter and spent 24 days in jail following his arrest.

Marion County Deputy Prosecutor Courtney Curtis said prosecutors sought a sentence that included prison time.

“There is no difference when a woman knows her attacker and when she doesn’t,” Curtis said. “I think it is important to remember that this crime is one that was committed in the home and so serving a home sentence in the home is not something this office would ever ask for.”

Boardman said she plans to work with organizations and advocates to help other rape victims.

“I want to be that person who’ll be strong for other women,” she said. “They cannot be scared that because of the extremely light sentence that was handed down in this case, that it would happen to them as well.”

Published May 21, 2014 Associated Press

CHICAGO v. MORALES ( No. 97-1121 ) 177 Ill. 2d 440, 687 N. E. 2d 53

CHICAGO v. MORALES ( No. 97-1121 )
177 Ill. 2d 440, 687 N. E. 2d 53, affirmed.


certiorari to the supreme court of illinois

No. 97–1121. Argued December 9, 1998—Decided June 10, 1999
Chicago’s Gang Congregation Ordinance prohibits “criminal street gang members” from loitering in public places. Under the ordinance, if a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be a gang member loitering in a public place with one or more persons, he shall order them to disperse. Anyone who does not promptly obey such an order has violated the ordinance. The police department’s General Order 92–4 purports to limit officers’ enforcement discretion by confining arrest authority to designated officers, establishing detailed criteria for defining street gangs and membership therein, and providing for designated, but publicly undisclosed, enforcement areas. Two trial judges upheld the ordinance’s constitutionality, but eleven others ruled it invalid. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the latter cases and reversed the convictions in the former. The State Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ordinance violates due process in that it is impermissibly vague on its face and an arbitrary restriction on personal liberties.

Held: The judgment is affirmed.

177 Ill. 2d 440, 687 N. E. 2d 53, affirmed.

Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and V, concluding that the ordinance’s broad sweep violates the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352. The ordinance encompasses a great deal of harmless behavior: In any public place in Chicago, persons in the company of a gang member “shall” be ordered to disperse if their purpose is not apparent to an officer. Moreover, the Illinois Supreme Court interprets the ordinance’s loitering definition—“to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose”—as giving officers absolute discretion to determine what activities constitute loitering. See id., at 359. This Court has no authority to construe the language of a state statute more narrowly than the State’s highest court. See Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U. S. 447. The three features of the ordinance that, the city argues, limit the officer’s discretion—(1) it does not permit issuance of a dispersal order to anyone who is moving along or who has an apparent purpose; (2) it does not permit an arrest if individuals obey a dispersal order; and (3) no order can issue unless the officer reasonably believes that one of the loiterers is a gang member—are insufficient. Finally, the Illinois Supreme Court is correct that General Order 92–4 is not a sufficient limitation on police discretion. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566. Pp. 16–20.

Justice Stevens , joined by Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg , concluded in Parts III, IV, and VI:

1. It was not improper for the state courts to conclude that the ordinance, which covers a significant amount of activity in addition to the intimidating conduct that is its factual predicate, is invalid on its face. An enactment may be attacked on its face as impermissibly vague if, inter alia, it fails to establish standards for the police and public that are sufficient to guard against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S., at 358. The freedom to loiter for innocent purposes is part of such “liberty.” See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116. The ordinance’s vagueness makes a facial challenge appropriate. This is not an enactment that simply regulates business behavior and contains a scienter requirement. See Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U. S. 489. It is a criminal law that contains no mens rea requirement, see Colautti v. Franklin , 439 U. S. 379, and infringes on constitutionally protected rights, see id. , at 391. Pp. 7–12.

2. Because the ordinance fails to give the ordinary citizen adequate notice of what is forbidden and what is permitted, it is impermissibly vague. See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611. The term “loiter” may have a common and accepted meaning, but the ordinance’s definition of that term—“to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose”—does not. It is difficult to imagine how any Chicagoan standing in a public place with a group of people would know if he or she had an “apparent purpose.” This vagueness about what loitering is covered and what is not dooms the ordinance. The city’s principal response to the adequate notice concern—that loiterers are not subject to criminal sanction until after they have disobeyed a dispersal order—is unpersuasive for at least two reasons. First, the fair notice requirement’s purpose is to enable the ordinary citizen to conform his or her conduct to the law. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451. A dispersal order, which is issued only after prohibited conduct has occurred, cannot retroactively provide adequate notice of the boundary between the permissible and the impermissible applications of the ordinance. Second, the dispersal order’s terms compound the inadequacy of the notice afforded by the ordinance, which vaguely requires that the officer “order all such persons to disperse and remove themselves from the area,” and thereby raises a host of questions as to the duration and distinguishing features of the loiterers’ separation. Pp. 12–16.

Justice O’Connor , joined by Justice Breyer, concluded that, as construed by the Illinois Supreme Court, the Chicago ordinance is unconstitutionally vague because it lacks sufficient minimal standards to guide law enforcement officers; in particular, it fails to provide any standard by which police can judge whether an individual has an “ apparent purpose.” This vagueness alone provides a sufficient ground for affirming the judgment below, and there is no need to consider the other issues briefed by the parties and addressed by the plurality. It is important to courts and legislatures alike to characterize more clearly the narrow scope of the Court’s holding. Chicago still has reasonable alternatives to combat the very real threat posed by gang intimidation and violence, including, e.g., adoption of laws that directly prohibit the congregation of gang members to intimidate residents, or the enforcement of existing laws with that effect. Moreover, the ordinance could have been construed more narrowly to avoid the vagueness problem, by, e.g., adopting limitations that restrict the ordinance’s criminal penalties to gang members or interpreting the term “apparent purpose” narrowly and in light of the Chicago City Council’s findings. This Court, however, cannot impose a limiting construction that a state supreme court has declined to adopt. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, n. 4. The Illinois Supreme Court misapplied this Court’s precedents, particularly Papachristou v. Jacksonville , 405 U. S. 156, to the extent it read them as requiring it to hold the ordinance vague in all of its applications. Pp. 1–5.

Justice Kennedy concluded that, as interpreted by the Illinois Supreme Court, the Chicago ordinance unconstitutionally reaches a broad range of innocent conduct, and, therefore, is not necessarily saved by the requirement that the citizen disobey a dispersal order before there is a violation. Although it can be assumed that disobeying some police commands will subject a citizen to prosecution whether or not the citizen knows why the order is given, it does not follow that any unexplained police order must be obeyed without notice of its lawfulness. The predicate of a dispersal order is not sufficient to eliminate doubts regarding the adequacy of notice under this ordinance. A citizen, while engaging in a wide array of innocent conduct, is not likely to know when he may be subject to such an order based on the officer’s own knowledge of the identity or affiliations of other persons with whom the citizen is congregating; nor may the citizen be able to assess what an officer might conceive to be the citizen’s lack of an apparent purpose. Pp. 1–2.

Justice Breyer concluded that the ordinance violates the Constitution because it delegates too much discretion to the police, and it is not saved by its limitations requiring that the police reasonably believe that the person ordered to disperse (or someone accompanying him) is a gang member, and that he remain in the public place “with no apparent purpose.” Nor does it violate this Court’s usual rules governing facial challenges to forbid the city to apply the unconstitutional ordinance in this case. There is no way to distinguish in the ordinance’s terms between one application of unlimited police discretion and another. It is unconstitutional, not because a policeman applied his discretion wisely or poorly in a particular case, but rather because the policeman enjoys too much discretion in every case. And if every application of the ordinance represents an exercise of unlimited discretion, then the ordinance is invalid in all its applications. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451. Contrary to Justice Scalia ’s suggestion, the ordinance does not escape facial invalidation simply because it may provide fair warning to some individual defendants that it prohibits the conduct in which they are engaged. This ordinance is unconstitutional, not because it provides insufficient notice, but because it does not provide sufficient minimal standards to guide the police. See Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611. Pp. 1–5.

Stevens, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and V, in which O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts III, IV, and VI, in which Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Breyer, J., joined. Kennedy, J., and Breyer, J., filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, J., joined.

This Just In:

Reciting the Pledge of Allegiance Is Constitutional in Massachusetts

We’ve known since the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in 1943 in the case of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette that it violated the First Amendment to compel students to say the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools. But does it violate the Constitution to give students the option to say the pledge?

Last week, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that voluntary participation in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance did not violate Massachusetts’ state constitution or its antidiscrimination law, and the ruling should inform a proper understanding of the U.S. Constitution as well.
Two anonymous students sued to stop their school district from allowing schoolchildren to recite the pledge. If you’re skeptical about whether the anonymous students were being used, you might be recalling the 2004 U.S. Supreme Court case in which Michael Newdow, a perennial litigant, tried to sue on behalf of his estranged daughter.

In this case, the two anonymous students claim to be “atheists and Humanists,” and they declined to say the pledge while in school. Were they bullied as a result? No. Were they even criticized? No. As Chief Justice Roderick Ireland wrote: “The plaintiffs’ claim of stigma is more esoteric. They contend that the mere recitation of the pledge in the schools is itself a public repudiation of their religious values.”

The Massachusetts Supreme Court rightly rejected these claims, holding that “[t]he fact that a school or other public entity operates a voluntary program or offers an activity that offends the religious beliefs of one or more individuals, and leaves them feeling ‘stigmatized’ or ‘excluded’ as a result, does not mean that the program or activity necessarily violates equal protection principles.”

This seems sensible. Mere offense that someone is voluntarily expressing religious views other than your own during school hours does not violate the Constitution. Indeed, as the Massachusetts Supreme Court noted, if this were the case, then the Massachusetts school condom vending machine program could be successfully challenged by traditional Christians or Jews who oppose birth control and are offended by having to see birth control in schools.

Certainly, last week’s decision is a victory for those who want to recite the Pledge of Allegiance in Massachusetts. But the troubling fact is that across the country, aggressive litigants are suing to block crosses, the Ten Commandments and other traditional accoutrements of American civic religion, purely on “offended observer” grounds. This type of easily offended litigant is not going away.

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